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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cesar Antonio Sepulveda appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony intimidating a witness and misdemeanor 
domestic battery, injury to child and two counts of attempted violation of a no 
contact order. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Connie Grainger lived next door to Sepulveda and L.M. and their children. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 144, L. 2 - p. 146, L. 10.) On the morning of December 27, 
2013, Ms. Grainger heard Sepulveda and L.M. arguing outside of their 
apartment. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 148, L. 18 - p. 149, L. 25.) Ms. Grainger recalled 
they were arguing about whether L.M. had been unfaithful to Sepulveda while he 
was in jail. (Id.) Sepulveda and L.M. continued arguing as they went into their 
apartment. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 1-17.) Ms. Grainger then described what 
she heard: 
Q. Would you describe for us what you heard. 
A. I heard a really loud bang. It sounded like they were going 
to come through my wall. And then right after I heard that, I heard 
one of the little kids that said - sorry, "Daddy, please don't kill 
mommy." And that's when I decided to call 911. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-17.) Ms. Grainger could hear the children screaming 
and she thought L.M. was being killed. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 151, Ls. 6-9.) She could 
hear the children screaming, "Stop," and she heard L.M. say, "Help me, 
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somebody help me, please. He is going to kill me." (8/11/14 Tr., p. 152, Ls. 9-
16.) Ms. Grainer called 911. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 153, L. 15-p.155, L.15; Ex. 2.) 
The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 with 
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor injury to child. 1 (R., pp. 8-9, 49-51, 
56-58, 166-167.) The magistrate issued a no contact order preventing 
Sepulveda from having any contact with L.M. (R., p. 14.) The no contact order 
was later amended to prevent Sepulveda from having contact with child victims 
as well. (R., p. 48.) 
While Sepulveda was in custody, the jail recorded phone calls in which 
Sepulveda attempted to contact L.M. through third parties and tried to get L.M. to 
say the allegations against him were false or else not to show up for court. (R., 
pp. 246-247.) The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2014-0001189 
with felony intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a 
witness and two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order.2 (Id.) 
The magistrate ordered the two cases consolidated. (R., p. 41. 3) On 
1 Sepulveda was originally also charged with felony possession of a controlled 
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia and two additional counts of 
misdemeanor injury to child, but these counts were dismissed prior to trial. (See 
R., pp. 166-167.) 
2 Case No. CR-FE-2014-0001189 is contained in the clerk's record from pages 
241-474. 
3 The record is not clear why the cases were not consolidated immediately after 
the magistrate entered the order. (R., p. 41.) However, after the two cases were 
bound over, the state again moved to consolidate the two cases. (R., pp. 298-
300.) At that time, the district court recognized that the magistrate's order had 
already consolidated the cases, and the cases were consolidated. (6/20/14 Tr., 
p.19, Ls. 13-21.) 
2 
February 28, 2014, the magistrate held separate preliminary hearings for each 
case. (R., pp. 45-47, 272.) L.M. testified that Sepulveda took her by the neck, 
got on top of her, and choked her with two hands. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 3-16.4) 
L.M. testified she was unable to breathe and thought she was going to die. 
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 23- p. 12, L. 1.) The magistrate bound over both cases. 
(R., pp. 45-47, 272.) 
Prior to trial, L.M. committed suicide by overdosing on methamphetamine 
and two drugs for which she had a prescription. (R., pp. 82-83; 8/11/14 Tr., p. 
10, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 7.) The state filed a pretrial motion to allow it to introduce 
L.M.'s preliminary hearing transcript at trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(1 ). (R., pp. 88-133, 138-151, 312-357, 360-373.) The district court 
granted the state's motion. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 34, L. 4 - p. 37, L. 16.) The district 
court held that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. 
and Sepulveda was not foreclosed from pursuing his line of questioning at the 
preliminary hearing. (Id.) 
The state also filed a Motion in Limine Regarding the Suicide of [L.M.] to 
exclude any reference to the cause or manner of L.M.'s death. (R., pp. 160-161, 
386-387.) The state argued that L.M.'s suicide months after the fact was 
irrelevant to the trial. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 7.) The district court 
held that while the cause of L.M.'s death would not be told to the jury, the jury 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all February 28, 2014 transcript citations are 
citations to the preliminary hearing in CR-FE-2013-18132. 
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would be told that her death had nothing whatsoever to do with this case. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 7.) 
At trial, the neighbor, Ms. Grainger, testified that she heard the children 
screaming, "Daddy, please don't kill mommy," and L.M. imploring for help. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 143, L. 17 - p. 155, L. 15.) The state also introduced a recording 
of Ms. Grainger's 911 call. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 153, L. 18 - p. 154, L. 25; Ex. 2.) 
The state introduced an underacted recording of L.M.'s preliminary 
hearing testimony into evidence. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 162, L. 18 - p. 163, L. 7.) After 
playing the audio, the district court instructed the jury that L.M. had died, but her 
death did not have anything to do with this case or Sepulveda. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 
163, Ls. 8-24.) 
Jaxon Bates, a paramedic, testified that paramedics responded to the 
scene and observed swelling on L.M.'s neck and under her chin. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 
168, Ls. 9-18.) The paramedics advised L.M. to go to the hospital. (8/11/14 Tr., 
p. 168, Ls. 23-25.) The paramedics observed that L.M. was "emotionally upset 
but was breathing normally with some minor swelling under her jaw and some 
minor pain and difficulty when she swallowed." (8/11/14 Tr., p. 181, L. 19 - p. 
182, L. 1.) The paramedics also did not observe any signs of intoxication in L.M. 
(8/11/14, Tr., p. 182, L. 14 - p. 183, L. 2.) 
Officer Chally testified that Sepulveda's injuries were consistent with 
injuries caused while he was attacking L.M. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 215, L. 21 - p. 216, 
L. 6.) Sepulveda's injuries were consistent with injuries inflicted by someone 
who was trying to get away or defend herself from Sepulveda. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 
4 
218, Ls. 15-23.) The state also introduced an additional 911 call made by L.M. 
later in the afternoon of December 27th, in which she requested to go to the 
hospital. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 231, Ls. 8-20; Ex. 18.) 
The state played jail phone recordings in which Sepulveda talked to L.M.'s 
sister, Kayla Welch, and he explained how it would be better if L.M. told the court 
that L.M. made it all up and it was not his fault. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 249, L. 12 - p. 
250, L. 25, p. 263, L. 9 - p. 264, L. 19; Ex. 19.) Ms. Welch also testified that 
when Sepulveda was in jail he requested her to get L.M. to tell the police the 
allegations against him were lies. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 279, L. 25 - p. 280, L. 7.) 
Ms. Welch also testified that she received a call from L.M. on the morning 
of December 27, 2013, and she could hear Sepulveda in the background calling 
L.M. a "bitch" and a "whore." (8/12/14 Tr., p. 275, L. 2 - p. 276, L. 1.) Ms. Welch 
testified that Sepulveda and L.M. were arguing about L.M.'s supposed infidelity. 
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 276, Ls. 2-6.) 
The state also played a jail phone call Sepulveda made to Lisa Cameron, 
the wife of Sepulveda's cellmate. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 264, L. 20 - p. 269, L. 16; Ex. 
20.) During that phone call Sepulveda gave Ms. Cameron L.M.'s phone number 
and told Ms. Cameron to tell L.M. that if she did not show up at the preliminary 
hearing the charges would be dropped. (Id.) Two days later Sepulveda again 
called Ms. Cameron and thanked her for telling his "sister" about court. (8/12/14 
Tr., p. 269, L. 17 - p. 270, L. 21; Ex. 21.) Officer Green, who was monitoring the 
jail phone calls, understood Sepulveda to be talking in code and the references 
to his "sister" were actually references to L.M. (Id.) 
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Ms. Cameron also testified and confirmed that Sepulveda called her and 
wanted her to tell L.M. not show up to court and to tell L.M. to say that the reason 
for the fight was because L.M. was off her medication. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 285, L. 19 
- p. 288, L. 4.) Ms. Cameron testified that she passed on to L.M. everything that 
Sepulveda told her to pass on. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 287, L. 25 - p. 288, L. 4.) John 
Johnson, Ms. Cameron's husband and Sepulveda's cellmate, testified that he 
befriended Sepulveda in jail and agreed to help him get ahold of Lisa Cameron 
so she could get ahold of L.M. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 294, L. 16- p. 296, L. 12.) 
Sepulveda presented evidence. The district court permitted Sepulveda to 
call L.M.'s counselor, Stacy Wright, and have her testify to what L.M. told her in 
counseling sessions. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 318, L. 16 - p. 319, L. 16.) Ms. Wright 
testified that L.M. had suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 
323, L. 21 - p. 324, L. 6.) However, Ms. Wright did not think L.M. was serious 
about her homicidal ideation. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, L. 20 - p. 331, L. 7.) Ms. 
Wright also testified that L.M. told her that Sepulveda had strangled her and that 
L.M. thought she was going to die. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 1-10.) L.M. also told 
Ms. Wright that her neck was sore. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 15-19.) 
Sepulveda also called Sara Bowman, the mother of Sepulveda's other 
child. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 24 - p. 334, L. 5.) Over the state's objection, Sara 
Bowman testified that L.M. threatened to take away Sepulveda's citizenship if he 
left. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 335, L. 9 - p. 336, L. 9.) 
Sepulveda then testified in his own defense. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 343, L. 7 - p. 
412, L. 9.) Sepulveda claimed L.M. attacked him and then attacked herself after 
6 
he discovered a methamphetamine pipe and he threatened to call Child 
Protective Services on her. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 347, L. 12 - p. 350, L. 23.) 
Sepulveda testified that L.M. had hurt herself before. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 410, L. 12 
- p. 411, L. 22.) 
On cross-examination, Sepulveda admitted that he wanted Ms. Welch, 
L.M.'s sister, to pass a message to L.M. in violation of the no contact order. 
(8/13/14 Tr., p. 392, L. 1 - p. 394, L. 21.) Sepulveda confessed he wanted Ms. 
Welch to pass a message to L.M. requesting that L.M. come to court and say 
certain things. (Id.) 
Also on cross-examination, Sepulveda admitted that his story regarding 
the incident had changed over time. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 377, L. 19 - p. 380, L. 19, p. 
408, L. 18 - p. 409, L. 7.) Sepulveda was forced to admit that, if his story was 
correct, then that Ms. Grainger's testimony, L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony, 
and Mr. Johnson's testimony were all inaccurate. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 381, L. 11 - p. 
382, L. 10.) 
The jury found Sepulveda guilty of domestic battery; injury to a child; 
intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness; and 
two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order. (R., pp. 183-184, 404-
405.) The jury found Sepulveda not guilty on the attempted strangulation count. 
(Id.) 
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Sepulveda to five 
years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 456-461.) The district court retained 
7 




Sepulveda states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional 
right to confront the witnesses against him when it granted the 
State's motion to present L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony 
during trial even though he had not been afforded an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. 
2. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's right to present 
a defense by not allowing him to present evidence challenging 
L.M.'s credibility based on its erroneous conclusion that the 
evidence was irrelevant. 
3. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional 
right to be free from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution 
by entering convictions and imposing sentences for each charge in 
the 2014 case when one of those charges was alleged as a means 
by which each of the other two charges was committed. 
4. Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even 
if this Court determines them to be individually harmless. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Sepulveda failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion when it determined that he had an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine L.M. and permitted the state to introduce L.M.'s preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial? 
2. Has Sepulveda failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion when it determined that the cause of L.M.'s suicide, which occurred 
seven months after the day in question, was not admissible? 
3. Has Sepulveda failed to show that felony intimidation of a witness 
is a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted violation of a no contact 
order such that a conviction for both violates double jeopardy and constitutes 
fundamental error? 
4. Does Sepulveda's cumulative error claim fail because he has failed 




Sepulveda Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Granted The State's Motion In Limine To Admit L.M.'s Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony At Trial 
A Introduction 
Sepulveda argues that the district court erred when it permitted the state 
to introduce L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
9-15.) Sepulveda claims he was not given an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine L.M. because the magistrate sustained the state's objection to his 
question regarding whether L.M. used methamphetamine a few days before the 
charged incidents. (See id.) The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined three 
illustrative, non-exclusive factors to determine whether a party had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness. All three of the factors indicate that 
Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. The district did 
not abuse its discretion when it granted the state's motion in limine to introduce 
L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine so we 
review the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for abuse of 
discretion.'' State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527-528, 328 P.3d 504, 507-
508 (2014) (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 878, 204 P.3d 508, 518 
(2009); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007)). "A 
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of 
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discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the 
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of 
reason." kl (citing State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521,528,300 P.3d 53, 60 (2013) 
(quoting Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347 
(2008)). The Court freely reviews questions of law. kl (citing State v. Meister, 
148 Idaho 236,239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009)). 
C. Sepulveda Had An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine L.M. 
'The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, '[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him."' Richardson, 156 Idaho at 527-528, 328 P.3d at 507-
508 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); U.S. Const. amend. 
VI). "The Confrontation Clause 'is made obligatory on the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."' kl at 528, 328 P. 3d at 508 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). "[T]his pmvision bars 'admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to 
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."' kl 
at 528, 328 P. 3d at 508 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54). Preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if 
the defendant had an "adequate opportunity to cross-examine." kl (citations 
omitted). 
It is undisputed that L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony was a 
"testimonial statement." See id. (the term "testimonial" applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing). Further it is undisputed that L.M. was 
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unavailable for trial. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 9-13.) Therefore the only question 
before the district court, and on appeal, is whether Sepulveda had an adequate 
opportunity for cross-examination. 
Whether a party had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination is 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 
509 (citing State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 309, 222 P.3d 471, 477 (Ct. App. 
2009)). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has identified three illustrative, non-
exclusive factors to determine whether a party had an adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509. "The first 
indication of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine is representation by 
counsel." Richardson, 156 Idaho at 528, 328 P.3d at 508 (citing Mantz, 148 
Idaho at 306, 222 P.3d at 474; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401-402). A second 
indication is no significant limitation "in any way in the scope or nature" of 
counsel's cross-examination. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 528-529, 328 P.3d at 
508-509 (citing Mantz. 148 Idaho at 306, 222 P.3d at 474; California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970)). The third indication is counsel's failure to "show any 
new and significantly material line of cross-examination that was not at least 
touched upon" in the preliminary hearing. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 
P.3d at 509 (citing Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307, 222 P.3d at 475; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 
408 U.S. 204, 215 (1973)). All three of these factors support the district court's 
determination that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
L.M. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.) 
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1. Sepulveda Was Represented By Counsel During L.M.'s Testimony 
Sepulveda was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing. 
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-11.) The first factor supports a finding that Sepulveda 
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. 
2. There Was No Significant Limitation On Sepulveda's Counsel's 
Cross-Examination Of L.M. 
At the preliminary hearing L.M. was cross-examined regarding whether 
she was on any medication, the cause of the argument, details regarding the 
choking, the location of the attack, why she did not immediately seek treatment, 
whether she hit Sepulveda, where she scratched Sepulveda, where she hit 
Sepulveda, whether she was on any medication the day of the incident, and 
whether she had been treated for anything else since she went to the hospital. 
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 16, L. 16 - p. 21, L. 9.) The magistrate even permitted 
Sepulveda to inquire regarding L.M.'s past history of self-harm when Sepulveda 
indicated he could lay additional foundation. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 - p. 17, L. 
1.) 
Sepulveda argues the magistrate significantly limited his counsel's ability 
to cross-examine L.M. because the magistrate sustained an objection to a 
question regarding L.M.'s previous drug use. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) 
Q. Now, you said you hadn't used any methamphetamine that 
day. Had you a few days prior to that? 
A. Yes. 
MS. FAULKNER: Objection, relevance. 
MS. COSHO: I think it is relevant, Judge, as to her state of mind. 
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THE COURT: A few days prior? 
MS. COSHO: Yes. 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.) 
Sepulveda argues the sustaining of this objection prevented him from 
exploring a source of potential bias and developing a credibility issue. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) The district court held that Sepulveda had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. at the preliminary hearing. (7/25/14 
Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.) 
And the third point is that at the preliminary hearing, the 
defense had an adequate opportunity to prepare and cross-
examine the witness. And on that point, it does seem clear to me 
that the defense did have an adequate opportunity to examine 
[L.M.] as to the events that led to the charges against Mr. 
Sepulveda in this case, the alleged domestic violence incident. 
There were a couple of instances in which objections were 
sustained during the preliminary hearing, but I think as to one of the 
those [sic] instances had to do with the allegation or the question to 
[L.M.], had she ever harmed herself. Defense counsel at that 
point, there's an objection to relevance, and then defense counsel 
indicates that she can lay more foundation. And the court sustains 
the objection and essentially invites defense counsel to lay more 
foundation. 
And I think defense counsel went a different direction and 
didn't come back to that point. I'm not sure it is true that the 
defense was truly foreclosed from pursuing that line of questioning 
during the preliminary hearing. 
In any event, it does appear to me that there was enough 
information available to the defense in terms of what was alleged to 
have happened in the underlying incident and the medical 
consequences to the victim to be able to prepare to cross-examine 
the witness. 
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To the extent Rule 804(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence 
bears on this point, it seems to kind of co-occupy this topic with 
Idaho Code 9-336. The issue under that rule would be whether 
defense counsel had a similar motive to develop testimony during 
the preliminary hearing as you would have at trial. And that 
certainly seems to be the case, that there would be a qualifying 
similar motive here. And the Richardson case would also suggest 
that that would be the correct conclusion in this instance. 
So in the end, I have a hard time seeing how this situation 
winds up being different in any material way than the situation that 
the Idaho Supreme Court confronted in the Richardson case and 
concluded that the preliminary hearing testimony was proper to be 
admitted into evidence. 
(7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.) 
On appeal Sepulveda claims the district court erred because, he 
contends, "[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that cross-
examination into the witness' drug history as a source of potential bias is a 
relevant inquiry and the presence of such an inquiry indicates that the 
opportunity to cross-examine was adequate." (Appellant's brief, p. 13 (citing 
Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-311, 
222 P.3d at 478-479).) Neither the holding in Richardson nor in Mantz supports 
Sepulveda's conclusion that a cross-examination is not adequate if the 
defendant does not inquire into the witness's drug history. 
In Richardson, the state charged Richardson with three counts of delivery 
of a controlled substance. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 526, 328 P.3d at 506. The 
charges were based on drug purchases made by Robert Bauer, a confidential 
informant. kl At the preliminary hearing Bauer testified, among other things, 
that he was addicted to methamphetamine but had not used methamphetamine 
on the days of the deliveries. kl at 527, 328 P.3d at 507. Bauer died before the 
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case could go to trial. & The state moved to admit Bauer's preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial, but the district court denied the motion. & The Idaho 
Supreme Court granted the state's permissive appeal. & The Idaho Supreme 
Court reviewed the transcript and determined that Richardson had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine Bauer at the preliminary hearing. & at 529, 328 
P.3d at 529. The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause only requires an 
"adequate opportunity for cross-examination of a witness, not a perfect one." kl 
Richardson may have preferred to be more aggressive or thorough 
with his cross-examination at the preliminary hearing had he known 
that Bauer would become unavailable, but the Confrontation 
Clause requires only an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination of a witness, not a perfect one. See Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 
(1985) ("Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish."); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 309 (1973) 
("[T]he right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and 
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal process."). 
& Whether a party had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine is 
determined on a case-by-case basis. & at 529, 328 P.3d at 509. 
In Mantz, Karl Hoidal and a group of his friends had been drinking and 
decided to drive four-wheelers. Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310, 222 P.3d at 478. 
Hoidal's four-wheeler ran into Mantz's truck and, during the ensuing 
confrontation, Mantz fired a handgun near Hoidal's head and threatened him. & 
The state charged Mantz with aggravated assault. & at 304-305, 222 P.3d at 
472-473. Hoidal testified at the preliminary hearing but died in an unrelated 
accident prior to trial. & at 305, 222 P.3d at 473. Pursuant to the state's motion 
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in limine, the district court admitted Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony at trial. 
kl The jury found Mantz guilty and he appealed. kl On appeal, Mantz argued 
that admitting Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated his right to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. kl The Idaho Court of Appeals first 
rejected Mantz's argument that preliminary hearings by their very nature do not 
provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. kl at 307-309, 222 P.3d at 
475-477. Instead the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it should use a 
case-by-case approach. kl at 309, 222 P.3d at 477. At the preliminary hearing, 
Hoidal testified that he had been recently charged with DUI. kl at 310, 222 P .3d 
at 478. Mantz asked Hoidal how many drinks Hoidal consumed on that 
occasion. kl at 311, 222 P.3d at 479. The state objected. kl Mantz argued 
that it was relevant to motive and credibility because Hoidal could have been 
trying to deflect responsibility for his own conduct leading up to and during the 
confrontation with Mantz. kl The magistrate sustained the objection on 
relevance grounds. kl On appeal, Mantz argued he was significantly limited in 
his cross-examination because the magistrate sustained this objection. kl The 
Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and held that, even if the sustained objection 
constituted a limitation, "it certainly was not significant enough to rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation." Id. 
This was the only limitation imposed by the magistrate. There is no 
indication that the magistrate sustained the objection because of 
any limited scope or inherent limitations of a preliminary hearing. 
Rather, the magistrate sustained the objection on general grounds 
of relevance. The relevance of the excluded evidence is highly 
questionable. In any event, even if we were to consider the 
sustained objection to be a limitation in the Confrontation Clause 
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context, it certainly was not significant enough to rise to the level of 
a constitutional violation. 
Contrary to Sepulveda's argument, neither Mantz nor Richardson "held 
that cross-examination into the witness' drug history as a source of potential bias 
is a relevant inquiry and the presence of such an inquiry indicates that the 
opportunity to cross-examine was adequate." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Instead 
both Mantz and Richardson held that whether a party had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine should be determined on a "case-by-case" basis. 
Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 309, 222 
P.3d at 477. And Mantz held that, even if there is a sustained objection to a line 
of questioning at the preliminary hearing, the resulting "limitation" on cross-
examination may not even be significant enough to rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. Mantz, 148 at 311, 222 P.3d at 479. 
Sepulveda claims his case is "more like White, where '[t]he trial 
judge ... cut off appellant's cross-examination on an important credibility issue 
before the issue could be properly developed."' (Appellant's brief, p. 14 (citing 
State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713, 551 P.2d 1344, 1349 (1976).) In White, the 
cross-examination arguably went directly to the witness' motivation to fabricate a 
kidnapping. See White, 97 Idaho at 712-713, 551 P.2d at 1348-1349. Here, 
Sepulveda asked L.M. if she used methamphetamine "a few days prior" to the 
day in question. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.) When the state objected on 
relevance grounds, Sepulveda argued it was relevant "as to her state of mind." 
(Id.) This question, purportedly attempting to establish L.M.'s "state of mind," did 
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not directly go to a motivation to fabricate the assault. Sepulveda's theory 
regarding the attempted strangulation was apparently that L.M. engaged in self-
harm. (See 7/25/14 Tr., p. 28, L. 5 - p. 30, L. 2.) Therefore it is not clear how 
methamphetamine use a few days prior would go to L.M.'s fabrication of the 
assault or even her perception and recollection of the events of the day. 
Sepulveda has failed to establish there was any significant limitation in the 
scope or nature of his cross-examination. This second factor supports a finding 
that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination 
3. Sepulveda Failed To Show Any New And Significantly Material Line 
Of Cross-Examination That Was Not At Least Touched Upon In 
The Preliminary Hearing 
Sepulveda also failed to "show any new and significantly material line of 
cross-examination that was not at least touched upon" in the preliminary hearing. 
See Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509 (citing Mantz, 148 Idaho at 
307, 222 P.3d at 475; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 215). "The new and significantly 
material line of cross-examination principle is related to the 'similar motive' 
element of I.R.E. 804(b)(1)." Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307, 222 P.3d at 475. The 
question is whether counsel's motive at trial was the same as at the preliminary 
hearing. kl If defense counsel's motive was to discredit and undermine the 
witness at the preliminary hearing, and defense counsel's motive was to discredit 
and undermine the witness at the trial-then defense counsel's motive was the 
same at both the trial and preliminary hearing. See id. That is the case here. 
Sepulveda's motive at both the preliminary hearing and trial was to discredit and 
undermine L.M.'s testimony. 
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Sepulveda argued that the new material he would have confronted L.M. 
with at trial was methamphetamine use and evidence that L.M. had 
methamphetamine and other unprescribed drugs in her system on the day of the 
incident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 (citing 8/11/14 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 20-23).) This 
argument is unsupported by the record. Sepulveda argued to the district court 
that prior to the preliminary hearing he did not have L.M.'s medical records. 
(7/25/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 - p. 30, L. 2, p. 31, L. 17 - p. 32, L. 5.) In response, the 
state clarified that prior to the preliminary hearing Sepulveda did have L.M.'s 
medical records from her visit to the hospital. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 32, L. 9 - p. 33, L. 
2.) The medical records were provided prior to the February 28, 2014 
preliminary hearing. (See id.; R, pp. 26-29, 34-37.) Therefore, L.M.'s medical 
records on the day of the incident were not "new." 
If Sepulveda had a new and significantly material line of cross-
examination Sepulveda could have presented those claims as evidence at trial. 
See Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence (I.RE.) 806, a defendant may attack an unavailable witness's 
credibility at trial "by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes 
if declarant had testified as a witness." JQ;_ (citing I.RE. 806). 'This rule provides 
that, when a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, 'the credibility of 
the declarant may be attacked."' JQ;_ (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 
420, 776 P.2d 424, 429 (1989); I.RE. 806). Here, that is exactly what 
happened. At trial, Sepulveda presented evidence that, on the day of the crime, 
L.M. had "mental health" issues. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 281, L. 21 - p. 282, L. 4, p. 
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344, L. 16 - p. 346, L. 24.) Sepulveda called Ms. Wright, a family nurse 
practitioner who worked at Riverside Rehab and who treated L.M. (8/12/14 Tr., 
p. 322, L. 19 - p. 325, L. 23.) Sepulveda also testified that L.M. was "suicidal" 
and "homicidal"; that he found a methamphetamine pipe on the day in question; 
and that L.M. had a "white film" around her mouth. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 219, Ls. 18-
21, p. 346, L. 15 - p. 348, L. 10.) 
Sepulveda failed to show there was any new and significantly material line 
of cross-examination that was not at least touched upon in the preliminary 
hearing. This third factor also supports a determination that Sepulveda had an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it granted the state's motion and permitted the introduction of 
L.M.'s preliminary hearing transcript at trial. 
11. 
Sepulveda Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
A. Introduction 
Sepulveda claims the district court erred when it "adopted" the 
magistrate's preliminary hearing evidentiary ruling sustaining an objection 
regarding whether L.M.'s used methamphetamine "a few days prior" to the 
charged crimes. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) Sepulveda also argues the 
district court erred when it declined to tell the jury that L.M. committed suicide 
and the means by which she committed suicide. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-22.) 
Because Sepulveda never asked the district court to rule on L.M.'s 
testimony regarding her prior drug use, the alleged error must be analyzed under 
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the fundamental error standard. Since evidentiary issues do not rise to the level 
of a constitutional error, his unobjected-to claim of evidentiary error does not 
meet the fundamental error standard necessary for appellate review. Further, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that evidence that L.M. 
committed suicide and how she committed suicide was irrelevant. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A trial court has 'broad discretion' in determining whether to admit or 
exclude evidence, 'and its judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed 
on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."' State v. Abdullah, 
158 Idaho 386, _, 348 P.3d 1, 117 (2015) (citing State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6, 
304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013); State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485, 
488 (2009)). 
C. Sepulveda Never Asked The District Court To Rule On The Admissibility 
Of Any Testimony Contained In L.M.'s Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
And, Because An Evidentiary Issue Cannot Meet The Fundamental Error 
Test, His Appeal On This Issue Fails 
At the preliminary hearing, the state objected on relevance grounds to 
Sepulveda's question regarding L.M.'s use of drugs "a few days prior" to the 
charged crimes. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.) Sepulveda argued L.M.'s prior 
drug use was relevant because it went to L.M.'s "state of mind." (Id.) The 
magistrate sustained the objection. (Id.) Sepulveda argues that he can appeal 
this evidentiary ruling because the district court necessarily "adopted" the 
magistrate's evidentiary ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) However, as 
Sepulveda himself points out, prior testimony admitted in lieu of live testimony is 
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"subject to all proper objections to admissibility at the trial which could have been 
raised a[t] the time the testimony was given." (Appellant's brief, p. 17 (citing 40 
A.L.R. 4th 514).) Sepulveda never asked the district court to make any 
evidentiary rulings regarding any testimony contained within L.M.'s preliminary 
hearing transcript. (See 7/25/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 - p. 32, L. 5; 8/11/14 Tr., p. 162, 
L. 18 - p. 163, L. 24.) He never asked the district court to review the 
magistrate's evidentiary ruling that the question regarding methamphetamine use 
a "few days prior" was not relevant. 
Idaho has limited appellate review of unobjected-to error to cases wherein 
the defendant has alleged the violation of a constitutionally protected right. State 
v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, _, 354 P.3d 505, 509 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2008); State v. Kirkwood, 111 
Idaho 623, 625-26, 726 P.2d 735, 737-38 (1986)). Where the asserted error 
relates not to an infringement upon a constitutional right, but is only a violation of 
a rule or statute, the fundamental error doctrine is not invoked. kl (citations 
omitted). Sepulveda did not make an evidentiary objection to any portion of 
L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony; therefore, he cannot now raise it on appeal 
because the alleged error is only an evidentiary rule violation and not a violation 
of a constitutional right. 
D. Sepulveda Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Declined To Tell The Jury That L.M. Committed Suicide And The 
Means By Which She Committed Suicide 
Prior to trial, the state moved "to exclude any reference to the cause or 
manner of [L.M.'s] death" because "the cause and manner of her death are 
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irrelevant for purposes of this trial." (R., pp. 160-161.) L.M.'s death was 
ultimately determined to have been suicide by overdose of three different drugs. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 18 - p. 11, L. 18, p. 14, Ls. 7-9.) L.M.'s suicide occurred 
approximately seven months after the December 27, 2013 attack, and was not 
relevant to any portion of the trial. (Id.) Sepulveda objected because he was 
concerned that the jury may speculate that Sepulveda had something to do with 
L.M.'s death, and he asked the court to consider providing some explanation as 
to how and why she died. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 21 - p. 12, L. 9.) Sepulveda 
also argued that L.M.'s suicide was relevant because it went to her continued 
struggle with methamphetamine and drug abuse. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 13, L. 20 - p. 
14, L. 6.) The state pointed out that it would have been misleading to say that 
L.M. overdosed on methamphetamine because two of the drugs she overdosed 
on were drugs that were prescribed. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-20.) The district 
court agreed with the state and held: 
THE COURT: Okay. I think that [the state's] suggestion is 
probably the best approach here for the court to simply indicate 
that [L.M.] has passed away in the interim and that her passing 
doesn't have anything whatsoever to do with this case and leave it 
at that. 
That would seem to be the best balance I can strike here. 
Because I agree that the cause of death just doesn't have anything 
to do with anything in terms of Mr. Sepulveda's guilt or innocence 
of the charges against him. 
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 7.) 
On appeal, Sepulveda argues that L.M.'s suicide is somehow relevant to 
her credibility regarding events that occurred seven months before her suicide. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 18-22.) Sepulveda's argument appears to be that 
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because L.M. had methamphetamine in her system when she committed 
suicide, it shows she was struggling with methamphetamine use on the day in 
question. (See id.) Sepulveda claims that evidence of L.M.'s suicide contradicts 
her preliminary hearing testimony. (Id. (citing State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 
739-741, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285-1287 (Ct. App. 2009)). 
Sepulveda has failed to articulate what portion of L.M.'s testimony was 
contradicted by her suicide seven months later. (Id.) Sepulveda does not 
explain how a suicide somehow impeaches testimony regarding events seven 
months prior to the suicide. Instead he insinuates that the suicide was somehow 
caused by or related to L.M.'s use of methamphetamine. Sepulveda presents no 
evidence that L.M.'s overdose was related to any drug problem. Instead, the 
information in the record indicates that it was an intentional suicide that involved 
methamphetamine and two different prescribed drugs. 
The district court did not err when it instructed the jury that L.M.'s death 
had nothing to do with the case or Sepulveda. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 163, Ls. 8-24.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you have just heard 
preliminary hearing testimony by [L.M.]. 
There was some discussion during the jury selection 
process of the fact that [L.M.] had passed away and would not be 
here to testify live and in person, and that's indeed why her 
testimony was - her preliminary hearing testimony has been 
presented to you today. 
I would instruct you that the circumstance doesn't have 
anything to do with this case whatsoever, and they don't have 
anything to do whatsoever with Mr. Sepulveda. It's simply not 
something that you should concern yourselves with at all as you 
think about and ultimately deliberate upon this case. It's just simply 
not a relevant topic at all to your task as jurors. 
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(Id.) Even if the jury instruction was error, it was harmless error. "Typically, 
under the harmless error test, once the defendant shows that a constitutional 
violation occurred, the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." State 
v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472, 272 P.3d 417,444 (2012). Here, evidence that 
L.M. committed suicide seven months after the date of the attacks would not 
have contributed to the jury's verdict. The state presented substantial evidence 
of the domestic violence and injury to child counts. In addition to L.M.'s 
testimony, the state presented the testimony of Ms. Grainger, the neighbor who 
heard the children and L.M. scream for their lives; Ms. Grainger's 911 call; and 
the paramedic who observed swelling under L.M.'s neck and chin. Sepulveda 
admitted on cross-examination that his story had changed over time. 
Regarding the influencing a witness and attempted violation of no contact 
order charges, the state presented recorded telephone conversations; the 
testimony's of Ms. Welch and Ms. Cameron who both testified that Sepulveda 
wanted them to influence L.M.'s testimony; and Sepulveda admitted he 
attempted to violate the no contact orders. L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony 




Sepulveda Has Failed To Show His Double Jeopardy Rights Under The Idaho 
Constitution Were Violated And Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Sepulveda contends, for the first time on appeal, that his double jeopardy 
rights under the Idaho Constitution were violated because "the means by which 
the intimidating the witness charge was alleged was the same as each of the 
charges alleging an attempt to violate the no contact order - contacting a person 
and asking them to contact L.M. on the defendant's behalf." (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 25-26) (citation omitted). Sepulveda failed to raise this claim below, and he 
has failed to show that it constitutes fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 
P.3d at 979. 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de 
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novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 
2011 ). 
C. Sepulveda Has Failed To Show That Felony Intimidating A Witness Is A 
Lesser Included Offense Of Misdemeanor Attempted Violation Of A No 
Contact Order 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Sepulveda to 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Sepulveda argues his unwaived constitutional right to be free from double 
jeopardy was violated, contending that, under the facts of this case, intimidating 
a witness is an included offense of violating a no contact order. (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 22-27.) "There are two theories under which a particular offense may 
be determined to be a lesser included of a charged offense." State v. Sanchez-
Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014) (quoting State v. Curtis, 
130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)). Those theories are referred to 
as the statutory theory and the pleading theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 
648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citations omitted). Idaho appellate courts apply the 
Blockburger5 test in analyzing whether an offense is an included offense under 
5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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the statutory theory. kl (citing State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 
519, 521 (2011)). Under this test, an offense is considered included in another 
offense "if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included 
offense are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the 
greater offense." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521 (quoting State v. 
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114, 594 P.2d 149, 152 (1979)). However, on 
appeal, Sepulveda only raises a claim under the pleading theory. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 22-27.) 
Idaho is among several jurisdictions which have, at least occasionally, 
utilized the "pleading theory" to determine whether the conviction and 
punishment for two offenses violates the double jeopardy clause of respective 
state constitutions. See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 372-375, 256 P.3d 776, 
780-84 (Ct. App. 2011).6 Under the "pleading theory," a court must consider 
whether the terms of the charging document allege that both offenses arose from 
the same factual circumstance such that one offense was the means by which 
the other was committed. l!;L Because the pleading theory relies on an 
examination of the charging Information, it generally provides a broader definition 
of greater and lesser included offenses than a statutory theory approach. l!;L 
The pleading theory holds "that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in 
6 In a post-Corbus case, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the Idaho 
Supreme Court's continued application of the "pleading theory" means that the 
"pleading theory" is the only theory to be applied when addressing a double 
jeopardy claim under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 
n.3, 330 P.3d 400, 404 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014); see also Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 
at 648-649, 339 P.3d at 373-374. The state is unaware of the United States 
Supreme Court ever applying the "pleading theory." 
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the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the 
higher offense." Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citing 
Sivakv. State, 112 Idaho 197,211,731 P.2d 192,206 (1986)). 
Sepulveda argues that "the language in the charging document 
demonstrates that the means by which the Information alleged the intimating the 
witness charge was the same as the means for each of the other two charges." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) "As such, the means by which the intimidating the 
witness charge was alleged was the same as each of the charges alleging an 
attempt to violate the no contact order - contacting a person and asking them to 
contact L.M. on the defendant's behalf." (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26 (citing 
Corbus, 151 Idaho 374-375, 256 P.3d at 782-783).) 
As pied, Mr. Sepulveda is alleged to have attempted to violate the 
no contact order in two instances, each time by trying to influence 
L.M.'s testimony. Thus, the intimidating charge is the means by 
which each attempt to violate the no contact order charges were 
committed. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 26 (citing R., p. 278).) Sepulveda's argument appears to be 
that because the attempted violation of a no contact order and the intimidating a 
witness occurred within the same course of conduct one is barred by double 
jeopardy. This is incorrect. "Those familiar with criminal procedure know that 
when there is evidence indicating that a defendant committed more than one 
offense during a course of conduct, the prosecuting attorney can seek an 
indictment charging each of those crimes as separate counts." Flegel, 151 Idaho 
at 530, 261 P.3d at 524. 
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Under Idaho's pleading theory, whether one crime is a lesser included 
offense of another crime can be determined from the face of the record simply 
by reading the information charging each crime. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 
837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013). The face of the record does not show 
that, as pied, felony intimidating a witness is a lesser included offense of 
attempted violation of a no-contact order.7 (See R., p. 278; 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122, 
L. 8 - p. 123, L. 1.) The information, as amended, states: 
COUNT I 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or 
between the 29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of 
January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully 
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent, and or did 
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent 
a witness, potential witness, and/or person the Defendant believes 
to be a witness, from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in a 
criminal proceeding, to-wit: Ada County case number CR-FE-2013-
0018132, in which the Defendant was charged with the crimes of 
Attempted Strangulation and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, by asking another person and/or persons to speak with 
[L.M.] and ask her to tell the court that she injured herself, that the 
allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or that her 
medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her 
not to appear for court. 8 
COUNT II 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about 
the 30th day of December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of 
7 Despite the Idaho authorities uniformly applying the "pleading theory" in the 
context of lesser included offenses, Sepulveda argues that felony intimidation of 
a witness is somehow a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted 
violation of a no-contact order. (See Appellant's brief, p. 27.) 
8 The district court, based on Sepulveda's motion, struck the "attempt" language 
from Count I. (8/8/14 Tr., p. 47, L. 10 - p. 48, L. 13.) The language "and or did 
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent" was struck 
from the Information. (Compare R., p. 278 with 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122, L. 8 - p. 123, 
L. 1.) 
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Idaho, attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no 
contact order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-213-
0018132, where the Defendant was charged with the offense of 
Attempted Strangulation, by calling [L.M.'s] sister and asking her to 
pass certain messages on to [L.M.]. 
COUNT Ill 
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about 
the 2nd day of January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, 
attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact 
order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-213-0018132, 
where the Defendant was charged with the offense of Attempted 
Strangulation, by calling a Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact 
L.M. on his behalf. 
(R., p. 278.) From the face of the information, not all the elements of intimidating 
a witness are pied in the attempted violation of a no contact order counts, 
therefore, the felony intimidating a witness was not pied "as a means or element 
of the commission of the higher offense." See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 
648, 339 P.3d at 373. 
Intimidation of a witness was not the "means or element" by which 
Sepulveda committed attempted violation of a no contact order. The Idaho 
Supreme Court recently explained that simply because two counts refer to the 
same actions, those two counts don't necessarily violate double jeopardy. 
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine is committed when a 
person "knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or [ ] is 
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) 
grams or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
methamphetamine or amphetamine." l.C. § 2732B(a)(4). Knowingly 
possessing a specified quantity of methamphetamine is one 
manner of committing the crime of trafficking. The language upon 
which Defendant apparently relies states that he and others 
conspired "to traffic in a controlled substance, by knowingly 
possessing methamphetamine." The words "by knowingly 
possessing methamphetamine" were not alleged as the means by 
32 
which the Defendant and others were alleged to have committed 
the conspiracy. The words obviously referred to the object of the 
conspiracy-they conspired to traffic in a controlled substance by 
knowingly possessing methamphetamine. 
Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649, 339 P.3d at 374. Sepulveda's manner of 
committing intimidating a witness was trying to get L.M. to "tell the court that she 
injured herself, that the allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or 
that her medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her not to 
appear for court." (R., p. 278.) This count makes no reference to the existence 
of a no contact order. (Id.) The means by which Sepulveda committed 
attempted violation of a no contact order was by attempting to violate the terms 
of no contact order. (Id.) This count makes no reference to whether L.M. was a 
witness or whether Sepulveda intended to prevent her from testifying. (Id.) The 
state could not have charged intimidating a witnesses as a "lesser included" 
offense of attempted violation of a no contact order, or vice versa. Simply 
because all these counts reference phone calls does not mean that one crime 
was an element or means by which the other crimes were committed. 
Further, as pied, Count I cannot be a lesser included offense of Counts II 
and Ill because the timeframe of Count I exceed those of Counts II and Ill. (See 
R., p. 278.) Intimidation of a witness was alleged to have taken place between 
the "29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of January, 2014." (Id.) 
Counts II and Ill were alleged to have occurred on or about December 30, 2013 
and January 2, 2014, respectively. (Id.) The timeframe of the actions 
encompassed by Count I, on the face of the Information, exceeds those of 
Counts II and Ill. 
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Intimidation of a witness is not the means or element by which Sepulveda 
committed attempted violation of a no contact order. Because Sepulveda cannot 
show that there was any violation of an unwaived constitutional right, Sepulveda 
has failed to show fundamental error. 
IV. 
Sepulveda's Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show 
Error, Much Less Multiple Errors To Cumulate 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and 
of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a 
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than 
one error." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) 
(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982). Because Sepulveda has 
failed to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in this case. Alternatively, 
given the weight of the evidence presented that Sepulveda was guilty of felony 
intimidating a witness, attempted violation of a no contact order, domestic battery 
and injury to child, the alleged errors, even in "aggregate do not show the 
absence of a fair trial." Parker, 157 Idaho at 149, 334 P.3d at 823. Sepulveda 
has therefore failed to show any basis for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Sepulveda's convictions. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2015. 
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